Straw Dogs by John Gray

Straw Dogs is John Gray’s assault on humanism. Gray, a British philosopher, doesn’t do optimism. He challenges the belief in human progress and our supposed uniqueness in nature.

The title comes from an ancient Chinese ritual: straw dogs were treated as sacred during ceremonies, then unceremoniously discarded afterward. For Gray, humanity itself is such a straw dog. Temporarily elevated by our own narratives, but ultimately disposable in nature’s indifferent scheme.

Straw Dogs by John Gray

Against Humanism: The Religion of Progress

Humanism, Gray argues, is a post-Christian religion masquerading as secular rationality. The assumption that humans can improve the world through reason and moral action is, in his view, dangerous folly inherited from Christianity’s teleological worldview.

Where Christianity promised salvation through Christ, humanism promises salvation through science, technology, and moral progress.

But Gray sees no evidence for this optimism. Humans became the dominant species not just through evolutionary luck. Climate change may be the mechanism through which the planet strikes back. Like other animals under stress, humans respond to environmental pressure with reduced reproduction, increased infections, and war. Not with enlightened cooperation but with the exact brutal mechanisms that govern all of nature.

Human (Non-)Exceptionalism

Gray’s most provocative claim: human consciousness does not make us special.

He draws on Schopenhauer’s dismissal of Kant’s rational individual. Humans are not autonomous conscious agents but, like all animals, embodiments of a universal Will. Our self-awareness is neither unique nor elevating.

This connects to Douglas Hofstadter’s “strange loop” theory in Gödel, Escher, Bach. Consciousness emerges from lower-level neural activity, like intelligence emerges from an ant colony.

Where Hofstadter finds beauty in this emergent complexity, Gray sees only further evidence that our consciousness is nothing special. Just another natural phenomenon. Nothing that elevates us above other animals or grants us cosmic significance.

Free will? A trick of the mind. A post-hoc rationalization we use to justify our actions. We tell ourselves stories about our choices, but these narratives are illusions.

Unconsciousness is just as powerful as consciousness, which is why meditation and similar practices aim to quiet the chattering mind. Gray doesn’t criticize these practices. He frames them as a correct understanding of the human condition and a solution to the problem of the burdensome conscious self.

Technology: Master or Plaything?

We cannot control technology, Gray insists. Humankind will misuse it despite our benign intentions. Science cannot bring reason to an irrational world. This contrasts with our current techno-optimism.

Gray’s vision of humans being replaced by their technical creations parallels Yuval Noah Harari’s warnings about AI and biotechnology. But Harari’s view is humanistic, concerned with preserving Homo sapiens as we know them. For Gray, human obsolescence is simply another turn in nature’s wheel. His question, “Would these machine replacements be more destructive than humans? Would it be worse?” betrays his anti-humanist stance. There is no cosmic scorecard. No inherent value in human survival.

In the future Gray envisions, digital technology will create a new wilderness, incomprehensible to humans in its entirety, extending the real world. Machines will have souls, spirits. Animism will extend to technology.

This is not science fiction dystopia but natural evolution. Consciousness was never exclusively human, so why shouldn’t it manifest in our mechanical offspring?

Language, Media, and the Manufactured Self

We use language to look back and forward, to create stories about ourselves. Christianity and humanism both destroy tragedy as a concept because they insist that there is always a better life possible. Either in this world through progress or in an afterlife.

But tragedy requires accepting that some suffering is meaningless, some losses irredeemable.

Gray observes that consciousness emerged as a side effect of language. Today, it has become a byproduct of the media. This connects directly to Neil Postman’s argument in Amusing Ourselves to Death about how media shapes consciousness.

Postman warned in his book that our obsession with entertainment and visual media would create what Huxley feared: a trivial culture “preoccupied with some equivalent of the feelies, the orgy porgy, and the centrifugal bumblepuppy.”

Gray’s observation that consciousness itself has become a media byproduct represents the ultimate fulfillment of Postman’s prophecy. We no longer consume media; media constitutes our inner lives. The self is manufactured, edited, and curated. A performance staged for an audience of ourselves and others, mediated through screens and feeds.

This connects to Marshall McLuhan’s famous dictum: “the medium is the message.” The technology itself, not its content, shapes consciousness and social organization. As Oliver Burkeman argues in Four Thousand Weeks, we’ve become so addicted to our devices and information streams that we’ve lost touch with our finite existence.

Gray would agree. Our media-saturated consciousness is just another distraction from the fundamental fact that we’re animals, not special beings with privileged access to truth or meaning.

Morality as Accident

Gray follows Freud in arguing that a sense of justice depends on childhood accidents. Being good is a result of good luck, not moral choice.

Moral intentions have a short history. Equality, the current moral orthodoxy, may well be succeeded by another framework. And so will our concepts of justice.

This relativism extends to the good life itself. Personal autonomy is an imagination. The most essential things in our lives are unchosen. We must improvise. The good life has no principles, no purpose. It simply is. What needs to be done is individual, not bound by universal morality. It comes naturally—or it doesn’t.

Provocatively, Gray notes that pleasure is most intense when mixed with sensations of immorality. (Like humor is best when it has a vile edge.) The good life flourishes not through following moral truths but despite, or because of, immorality.

This isn’t nihilism so much as naturalism. Animals don’t consult ethical frameworks, yet they live and flourish.

Economic Realities and the Obsolescence of the Masses

Industrialization created the working class and will make it obsolete. Gray predicted this before Piketty and Sandel analyzed how meritocracy creates a new aristocracy.

Sandel’s The Tyranny of Merit nails it: our meritocratic system humiliates losers while making winners insufferable. Piketty and Sandel want progressive taxation, greater equality, and what Sandel calls “contributive justice”. Ensuring everyone can contribute to the common good and receive recognition.

Gray would call this a more humanist delusion. The very belief that we can engineer a more just society through policy reform is the folly he attacks. Moral intentions have a short history. Today’s orthodoxy of equality will be succeeded by another. Justice itself is contingent, not absolute.

Economic life is geared toward satisfaction, manufacturing increasingly exotic needs, goods, and experiences. Drugs, sex, violence: antidotes to boredom. This is consumer capitalism’s truth, stripped of pretense. We’re not building toward anything. We’re distracting ourselves from the void.

Gray wrote during a period when wars were increasingly seen as non-state-driven: Al Qaeda, terrorism. We know better now. Russia operates as a mafia-based anarcho-capitalist state, spreading its model across the Western world. The US, Hungary, elsewhere. (Putin’s kleptocracy as export model—what a time to be alive.)

Future wars will be wars of security, not ideology. War has become a game, an entertainment for consumers in rich countries. Real war remains a habit of the poor, a violent chase for the dream of freedom.

Religion, Atheism, and the Death of God

Atheism, Gray argues, is part of Christianity. In polytheism, it never existed.

Christianity was the first religion to claim exclusive truth: one God, one path to salvation. When Europeans stopped believing in God, they didn’t abandon this structure. They simply replaced God with other absolutes: progress, reason, science, humanity.

Technical immortalists believe technology can make humans immortal. (Really, these Silicon Valley types are just monks in hoodies.) They’re engaged not in a scientific project but in a religious one, attempting to free us from fate and mortality.

Suffering, savior, deliverance: constructs designed to attract and retain believers in faiths, including Christianity and humanism. In humanism, miracle, mystery, and authority are embodied by science and technology.

But this is, as the Dutch say, a hersenschim—a phantom, an illusion.

The advance of our knowledge deludes us into thinking we’re different from animals. We’re not.

Gray’s Consolation: The Art of Contemplation

After this relentless demolition, Gray offers an unexpected consolation, a way to deal with the horrific facts we mortal humans face.

Action to create progress is illusory. Contemplation is underrated. Progress implies a destination. Play has no point. We labor like Sisyphus, pushing the boulder up the hill, watching it roll back down.

But can we make labor more playful? Can we approach technology and science not as means of mastering the world but as forms of play? No mastering, no progress. Just play.

Spiritual life, in Gray’s conception, is a release from the search for meaning. The perfection of humankind is a dreary purpose. The idea of progress is like searching for immortality, a denial of what we are.

Contemplation means surrendering to the never-returning moments, turning away from yearnings, and focusing on mortal, transient things. Groundless facts, things that simply are, without justification or purpose, are the proper objects of contemplation.

The aim of life: to see.

Not to improve. Not to progress. Not to perfect. Just to see. Clearly. Without humanistic hope blurring the view.

Conclusion: Debunking as Philosophy

Gray’s Straw Dogs is philosophy as demolition. Not comfort, not guidance. Just stripping away delusions.

Harari warns of AI doom. Piketty and Sandel champion equality. Postman’s media warnings were vindicated and ignored. We still believe in progress, in human perfectibility.

Gray’s voice? Either necessary corrective or intolerable provocation.

Probably both.

Connections

Without a preconceived plan, I have written about Neil Postman’s media critique, about Burkeman’s meditation on mortality in Four Thousand Weeks, about McLuhan’s “the medium is the message.” Gray’s pessimism dialogues with all of them. Also with Hofstadter on consciousness, with Piketty and Sandel on meritocracy, with Harari on technology’s future.

Gray rejects control and mastery, like Taleb in Antifragile. Taleb’s distinction between the fragile (technology, complex systems) and the antifragile (natural processes, ancient wisdom) parallels Gray’s preference for contemplation over action. Both recognize that human attempts to engineer perfect systems inevitably backfire.

Burkeman’s meditation on our four thousand weeks echoes Gray’s call to surrender to finitude. Where humanists seek immortality through progress or technology, both Burkeman and Gray counsel acceptance of mortality as the path to authentic living. The “paradox of limitation” Burkeman describes (that embracing our constraints makes life more meaningful) is fundamentally Gray’s position: stop trying to transcend your animal nature and simply live within it.

Daniel Dennett over bewustzijn, de mierenhoop

How to Criticize with Kindness: Philosopher Daniel Dennett ...
Daniel Dennett

In de NRC van zaterdag half november (ik schreef dit jaren geleden een interview met Daniel Dennett – ergens in 2008 denk ik?). Ik hoorde trouwens toevallig van de week ook zijn TED toespraak – Conscioussness is a bag of tricks…). Hij is voor een prijs in Nederland. Over het bewustzijn van een termietenheuvel. Ik kende de gelijkenis al uit Godel, Escher, Bach  – An Eternal Golden Braid, het boek van Douglas Hofstadter. Maar ik moest denken aan Facebook en Twitter en andere siciale media, waaraan miljoenen termieten werken, en waaraan misschien ook wel een hoger bewustzijn is te extraheren door er op een andere manier, op een gepaste afstand naar te kijken. Het is natuurlijk zeer interessant, en ik geloof ook dat Hofstadter dat in GEB al doet (al zou ik het er voor moeten herlezen om dit te kunnen bevestigen) om de menselijke maatschappij, net als de termietenmaatschappij van een afstandje te bekijken, en hier een hogere betekenis aan toe proberen te kennen. Een ziel? Dzjing! zegt Hofstadter.

Onze miljarden hersencelletjes die een ziel vormen, die op Twitter zit te tikken met miljoenen soortgenoten zo een ziel vormen, met Tumblr, Facebook, Google+ en soortgenoten een ziel vormen,… Dzjing!.

Trouwens, nu we het er toch over hebben, dat wil zeggen, ik spring er met mijn gedachten naar toe, in het boek ‘The Lifebox, The Seashell and the Soul‘ bespreekt Rucker de Lifebox – een instrumentje dat je leven opneemt. Goed lezen en je ziet die mogelijkheden in de social media software. Het kastje dat je bij je draagt is niet de Lifebox, maar is slechts een medium dat je toegang geeft tot je Lifebox, door middel van een app of een website wordt je Lifebox gevuld, aangevuld met fysieke informatie over waar je bent als je incheckt, een foto neemt, een aantekening maakt, opgeslagen in de Cloud.

De cloud!… beter wordt het niet.

Richard Dawkins and the Expert’s Pitfall: A Critique of The Selfish Gene Footnote

the selfish gene - richard dawkins book cover

The Vile, Yet Correct Critique of Hoyle

In the 30th anniversary edition of ‘The Selfish Gene’ (2006), Richard Dawkins writes a vile but correct comment on Fred Hoyle’s misrepresentation of Darwinism in an endnote (pp. 277-278). He ends his note:

Publishers should correct the misapprehension that a scholar’s distinction in one field implies authority in another. And as long as that misapprehension exists, distinguished scholars should resist the temptation to abuse it.

This is a very accurate observation. But on the same page, in the note referenced in the main text (page 59 of the 30th Anniversary edition), Dawkins almost falls into the trap himself.

richard dawkins portait photo
Richard Dawkins

The Stain on the White Robe: Dawkins’ Error

The note’s text to the main text is so incredibly incorrect that it is pretty funny, given that he does this on the same page as his scolding of Hoyle.

In the note, Dawkins wants to explain Daniel Dennett’s theory of consciousness. Although Dennett has tried to explain his ideas in several books, Dawkins wants to summarize Dennett’s work in this two-page note for unclear reasons.

daniet dennett portrait photo
Daniel Dennett

Incorrect Analogies from Computer Science

Dawkins takes two technical ideas from the world of computers to illustrate his ideas: the concept of a virtual machine and ’the distinction between serial and parallel processors’.

The Virtual Machine

Dawkins starts by explaining what a virtual machine is incorrectly. He mentions the Macintosh User Interface as an example of a virtual machine. The Mac is a great machine, but the Macintosh User Interface bears little resemblance to a virtual machine, and the connection with consciousness remains very unclear. Dawkins could have relied on the Wikipedia article for a correct description of virtual machines.

A virtual machine (VM) is a software-based “computer within your computer.” It lets you run a separate operating system (like Windows or Linux) in an isolated window, using your existing hardware. It’s like having a sandboxed PC inside your real one.

Serial and Parallel Processors

The story derails entirely when Dawkins turns to his description of ‘serial and parallel processors’. The piece is so incorrect that highlighting the individual errors here makes no sense. Since Dawkins fails to see the distinction between processors and processes. He starts wrong and worsens things in every sentence. And it’s not like this was rocket science at the time of writing. Parallel processing has been known and applied in computing since our own Edsger Dijkstra and others invented concepts like the semaphore and the indivisible instruction.

More linkages to Dennett’s work and that of his friend Douglas Hofstadter on page 59, where Dawkins discusses self-awareness and rejects ideas of self-awareness because

douglas r. hofstadter portrait photo
Douglas R. Hofstadter
godel escher bach by hofstadter book cover

it involves an infinite regress if there is a model of the model, why not a model of the model of the model …?

The Mind’s I‘ and also ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach – An Eternal Golden Braid‘ deal exactly with these issues.

The Salvation: A Self-Aware Disclaimer

So, can we conclude that Dawkins has fallen into the trap of asserting that a scholar’s distinction in one field implies authority in another?

As I said, almost. On page 280 Dawkins saves himself, on the edge, with this little remark:

the minds I by hofstadter book cover

‘The reader is advised to consult Dennett’s own account when it is published, rather than rely on my doubtless imperfect and impressionistic – maybe even embellished – one.’

How true.

I have never had such fun with academic footnotes.

linning the books of dennett, dawkins and hofstadter